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I. INTRODUCTION

The fishing industry has been important to many nations of
the world since mankind first sailed the ocean. The diets and
economies of many nations are still inextricably linked to the sea.
Prior to 1900, the international fishing fleets were guided only by
the principle of "catch-as-catch-can." Demand seemed relatively light
when contrasted with the seemingly endless supply, and fishing had
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little effect on the international stock of fish. In addition, the gain
to be realized by restricting access and extending jurisdictional
claims over the ocean was slight in comparison to the costs of enforcing an exclusive access system. 1 The development of new
technology since 1900, however, has rendered ocean surveillance
cost efficient,2 and larger populations and increased technical
capabilities have caused a dramatic increase in the world demand
for fish products resulting in tremendous pressure on the fisheries
of the oceans. "It has been estimated that the worldwide harvest
of these resources has increased fifteenfold" 3 since the beginning
of the twentieth century.
The world commercial catch of fish and other aquatic organisms
has steadily increased in recent years and in 1981 amounted to
74,760,000 metric tons! In 1976, it was estimated that six countries
accounted for fifty percent of the world catch of fish-Japan (14.8
percent), the U .S.S.R. (14.1 percent), China (6.4 percent), Peru (6.0
percent), Norway (4.7 percent), and the United States (4.1 percent). 5
The commercial fishing industry of the United States increased its
catch each year after 1977, and in 1981, the United States had gone
from the sixth to the fourth largest fish producing nation in the
world. 6 Catches of the U.S. commercial fishing industry totaled 6.4
billion pounds valued at $2.4 billion in 1982, representing an increase
of seven percent in quantity over 1981.7 The economic value of the
marine recreational fishing industry is also significant. 8 The total
value of edible and nonedible fishery products imported by the
United States is estimated at $4.5 billion, and this amount far exceeds the $1.1 billion value of U.S. domestic exports of these same
products. 9
1. Prewo, Ocean Fishing: Economic Efficiency and the Law of the Sea, 15 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 261, 262 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Prewo].
2. Id.
3. Taft, The Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference: Major Unresolved Fisheries Issues,
14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 112, 112 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Taft].
4. This figure does not include marine mammals and aquatic plants. NAT'L OCEANIC
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T. COMMERCE, FISHERIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1982 26 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as FISHERIES 1982].
5. NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, FISHERY STATISTICS
OF THE UNITED STATES 1976 40 (1980) [hereinafter cited as FISHERY STATISTICS 1976].
6. FISHERIES 1982, supra note 4, at· 26.
7. Id. at iv.
8. See Warner, Conservation Aspects of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act
and the Protection of Critical Marine Habitat, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 97, 97 (1983)[hereinafter
cited as Warner]; NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, MARINE
RECREATIONAL FISHERY STATISTICS SURVEY, ATLANTIC AND GULF COASTS, 1979 (1980).
9. FISHERIES 1982, supra note 4, at v.
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This increased demand upon ocean resources intensifies the
need for regulation. Different catch limits for different species of
fish are now recognized as necessary to rational fisheries management. Achieving the goal of effective management has proved difficult for two reasons. First, most overexploited stocks inhabit international waters where national regulation is ineffective. Second,
no international authority exists to legislate and enforce rules to
preserve fishery resources. 10

II. ANADROMOUS AND CATADROMOUS FISH STOCKS,
SEDENTARY SPECIES, AND HIGHLY MIGRATORY
SPECIES
A. DELIMITATION OF PROBLEMS

One very basic impediment to rational fisheries management
was the traditional and widespread belief that the high seas were
common areas and that ocean resources were common property.
While the term "common property" was frequently utilized, it was
used de facto to mean res nullius (i.e., the property of nobody), and
the general laymen's use of "common property" should not be confused with the concept of the "common heritage of mankind" based
on res communes (i.e., things common to all). Historically, farmers
grazed their livestock on communal fields and common pastures,
particularly in common law countries. The frequent result was
overgrazing. 11 Given a limited resource and no system of allocation
but "first-come-first-served," the ultimate result was destruction
of the resource and the industries dependent on it. Under such a
system, it can be postulated that each seafaring nation will seek
to harvest all the fish it can, knowing that another country will do
so if it does not. No country will attempt to conserve fish stocks
because what it can preserve, another will take. This problem has
been called the "tragedy of the commons." 12 When applied to the
fisheries scenario, the result has been overfishing and depleted
stocks. 13 As human populations increased, most common law countries abandoned the "commons" concept with regard to food gathering, pasturing, and hunting and fishing areas; however, the com10. Copes, The Law of the Sea and Management of Anadromous Fish Stocks, 4 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L.J. 233, 233-34 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Copes].
11. Id. at 248-49.
12. See Alverson, Management of the Ocean's Living Resources: An Essay Review, 3
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 99, 111 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Alverson]; Hardin, The Tragedy
of the Commons, in ENVTL. HANDBOOK (G. DeBell ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Hardin].
13. Alverson, supra note 12, at 111.

Published by SURFACE, 1984

3

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 1 [1984], Art. 3

12

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 11:9

munal approach has not been fully abandoned internationally. 14
Fisheries management presents certain problems not evident
in other conservation activities. First, fish cannot easily be confined
to particular areas. They move - often between areas of national
control and the high seas (anadromous and catadromous species)
or between widely separated areas of the high seas (highly
migratory species). Second, fish are both a perishable and a
replenishable resource. Since fisheries are such an important food
source, they cannot and should not be absolutely protected, but they
should not be depleted beyond their capacity to replenish
themselves. Determining the optimum annual harvest of any species,
however, presents extraordinary technical difficulties. 15
The difficulties of fisheries management are illustrated by
Canada's efforts to conserve its stocks of Pacific and Atlantic
salmon. Salmon is an anadromous species, that is, one which: (1)
spawns in fresh waters; (2) spends most of its life cycle in the ocean
where the fish mature; and (3) returns to the rivers and streams
of its origin to renew the cycle. 16 Protection and enhancement of
salmon stocks during the freshwater phase of the life cycle are
extremely important to achieve maximum returns from the salmon
resource. The country of origin must ensure that pollution in salmon
rivers is held to a minimum. Obstructions to the salmon run, such
as landslides, dams, and other obstacles, must either be removed
or overcome. Habitat improvement, as well as the operation of
spawning channels and hatcheries, may add greatly to the buildup of salmon stocks. Of course, these improvements require substantial government expenditures.
It has also been demonstrated that salmon eggs can be introduced into a lake to which salmon are not indigenous, that the
eggs will hatch, and that the salmon will return to that lake to
spawn. This ability to move salmon to new areas is heartening to
environmentalists, but it should not be considered to be a panacea
for manmade water projects which interfere with the indigenous
salmon run. Salmon must be protected in their natural habitats.
Inevitably, the use of a river for salmon production competes
with other uses, such as, power generation, flood control, industrial
14. Hardin, supra note 12, at 48.
15. Kronfol, The Exclusive Economic Zone: A Critique of Contemporary Law of the Sea,
9 J. MAR. L. & COM. 461, 465-66 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Kronfol].
16. Taft, supra note 3, at 114-15.
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waste disposal, irrigation, and navigation. An economically rational
choice between competing uses will be made by a country only if
it incurs the full cost and benefit of the choice. 17 Even so, a large
proportion of salmon originating in Canadian and U.S. rivers is
caught by nations which did not contribute to the Canadian or U.S.
salmon program.
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III) attempted to solve some of these problems. For
example, the Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention)18
negotiated at UNCLOS III, creates an exclusive economic zone
(EEZ), 19 in which coastal states are entitled to exercise "sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources," 20 including the fish stocks. Under
this "functional jurisdiction," first proposed by Canada and the
United States, the coastal state may not exercise authority over
maritime activities concerned with the internationally lawful uses
of the sea which are related to navigation and communication 21 in
the expanse of water outside its own narrow territorial sea.
The proposed regime, as promulgated in the early negotiations
in 1976, specifically allowed coastal states to implement rational
fishery management plans for all fish stocks specific to their
economic zones.
Coastal states' rights and responsibilities include the right to determine the allowable catch of the living resources in the zone for
the purpose of achieving the "maximum sustainable yield" of the
fisheries population [Article 61]. The coastal state is also given the
right to determine the objective of the "optimum utilization of the
living resources in the exclusive economic zone." Where the coastal
state does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable
catch, it must through agreements and other arrangement and pursuant to a wide variety of factors, give other states access to the
surplus of the allowable catch [Article 62]. 22

17. See Copes, supra note 10, at 242, 244.
18. Done Dec. 10, 1982, reprinted in 21 1.L.M. 1261, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as LOS Convention].
19. Id. arts. 55-75. As the rights of the coastal state in its economic zone are not
exclusive, the exclusive economic zone is more properly referred to as just the "economic
zone."
20. Id art. 56, para. l(a).
21. Id art. 58, para. 1; see Copes, supra note 10, at 235.
22. Kronfol, supra note 15, at 464; see LOS Convention, supra note 18, arts. 61-62.
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Although the concept of "maximum sustainable yield" 23 (MSY) has
been modified somewhat, these rights and responsibilities are
preserved in the LOS Convention. As most fish are caught within
200 miles of land, adoption of the EEZ concept has caused and will
continue to cause political and economic problems for the distantwater fishing nations.
Some of these problems have already occurred in the United
States. Concern with the depletion of fish stocks near U.S. shores
led Congress to enact the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act of 1976 (FCMA or MFCMA) 24 creating a 200-mile exclusive
fisheries zone around American coasts. Between the enactment of
FCMA and March 1977, Russian trawlers were cited for fifty-three
violations, and the situation became even more serious in April 1977,
when the Coast Guard seized a Russian trawler. 25 Although the crisis
was resolved peacefully in this case, the potential for a dangerous
showdown is clear.
The LOS Convention does not provide a satisfactory solution
to the problem. Faced with the argument that stronger language
would abridge the sovereign rights of coastal states over fish in
their EEZ's, the negotiators settled on an article which calls merely
for cooperation among involved countries to provide for adequate
management. 26 The article is merely hortatory, and neither sanctions nor enforcement procedures are provided to deter uncooperative countries. 27
The chance of establishing bilateral agreements between countries interested in fishery resources within a given EEZ may be
quite high. The United States has successfully utilized this bilateral
agreement approach and should continue to do so in the future. With
regard to those areas of the high seas and to those species that
do not remain within the EEZ, however, there may be several interested countries, and agreement becomes more difficult. 28 Problems with initial catch quotas and future adjustments to quotas may
prove to be insurmountable, and differing opinions concerning optimal management guidelines or acceptable fishing methods may
23. For a good discussion of "maximum sustainable yield," see H. KNIGHT, THE LAW
OF THE SEA: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND READINGS 659-62 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LOS CASES].
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1801-1882 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
25. See A Littl,e Stink About a Lot of Fish, TIME, Apr. 25, 1977, at 46.
26. See LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 63.
27. See Copes, supra note 10, at 235.
28. Id. at 236.
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be difficult to reconcile. Even if countries can surmount the initial
stages of a particular fishery negotiation, the agreement could
founder under pressures from outside countries not party to the
agreement. These countries may make unacceptable quota demands
or simply ignore the regulations. Countries which were originally
adherents to the fisheries regime may then feel entitled or compelled to increase their catch to make up for the fish taken by
interlopers. 29
The North American salmon situation provides an illustration.
Canadian and U.S. investment averaged $8.99 million between the
years 1969 and 1974. 30 The gross value of Canada's east coast salmon
catch, however, averaged only $2.75 million over the same period.31
The salmon stocks off Greenland, where salmon regularly migrate
to feed, increased benefiting from American and Canadian
management. 32 While the United States and Canada suffered a loss
on their investments, Greenland fishermen realized a profit. 33 The
inevitable result of such an inequitable arrangement will probably
be the discontinuation of conservation efforts.
The LOS Convention formally acknowledges the primary right
of the country of origin to its anadromous and coastal stocks. 34 The
logic of placing the management and harvest of anadromous stocks
under the regulation of the coastal states where such stocks
originate is implicitly recognized by all the nations which participated in UNCLOS III. Even so, there are several "escape
clauses" incorporated into the LOS Convention which allow for the
circumvention of this principle. For example, high seas fishing for
anadromous species is permitted if the "non-states of origin" can
show that they would suffer "economic dislocation" without such
fishing. 35 Even such developed nations as Japan could make such
a claim. About fifty percent of Japan's annual catch of eleven million
tons is taken from foreign seas. 36 After the United States and the
U .S.S.R. implemented their 200-mile fishery zones, the $7 .2 billion
Japanese fishing industry had approximately 5,500 fishing and pro29. Id. at 235-36.
30. Id. at 240.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 66.
35. Id.
36. JAPAN: Pinched Between 200-Mi"le Limits, U.S.

NEWS

& WORLD REP., Feb. 28, 1977,

at 70.
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cessing boats idled, and Japanese cannery traffic slowed
significantly. 37
The LOS Convention requires the respective countries of origin
to cooperate in mitigating this economic impact, but non-states of
origin have no reciprocal obligation to minimize losses to states of
origin in their management of stocks. 38 The country of origin is required to set up conservation programs to govern the use of its
coastal and anadromous stocks, yet non-states are not obligated to
follow the maximum-catch rule. 39 Therefore, due to noncompliance
by non-states of origin, the only way for the state of origin to
stabilize the catch at the maximum sustainable yield is to limit the
catch of its own nationals. 40 The result is a constructive subsidy
for foreign fleets.
In 1970, a "Declaration of Principles" by the U.N. General
Assembly stated that the seabed beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction, together with its resources, constituted the "common
heritage of mankind." 41 The EEZ concept, however, does little to
promote equitable distribution of the resources of the "common
heritage." Under this concept, the developed nations have received
a disproportionately large share of ocean fisheries, and thus have
derived the greatest benefit from such a regime. For example, seven
nations (the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Portugal, and the U.S.S.R.) control twenty-four percent of the area included within economic zones. 42
The rights of the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged
states (LL/GDS) must also be considered. Under existing international law, the LL/GDS may fish in the high seas, but the transformation of these fishing grounds into exclusive zones has seriously
hurt, if not totally eliminated, the fishing conducted by the
LL/GDS. 43
The LOS Convention provides for sharing of fishery resources
37. Fishing to get around the 200-mi. limit, Bus. WEEK, May 9, 1977, at 36.
38. LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 66, para. 3(b); Copes, supra note 10, at 246.
39. See Copes, supra note 10, at 246.
40. Id. at 246.
41. Declaration of Principles on the Seabed Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); see Note,
A "Common Heritage" Approach to Fisheries Through Regional Controls, 10 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 171, 171 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Regional Approach].
42. Regional Approach, supra note 41, at 183.
43. See J ayakumar, The Issue of the Rights of Lanlocked and Geographically Disadvantaged States in the Living Resources of the Economic Zone, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 69, 72 (1977).
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with the landlocked states, 44 but the duty could be unduly burdensome for the parties to a sharing agreement. For example, Tanzania,
a coastal state, has five landlocked neighbors, while Uganda, a
landlocked state, is surrounded by four coastal states. 45 Sharing of
resources with geographically disadvantaged states is also provided.
Zaire, with a surface area of nearly one million square miles but
with a minimal shoreline, is accorded a zone of only twelve nautical
miles. 46
From a global perspective, the EEZ concept is not the answer
to rational fishery management:
The spatial concept of jurisdiction, that is, selecting a given area
over which control is to be exercised, does not take into account
the distribution and structure of the fisheries resource, and is
therefore unlikely to bring the entire resource under the control
of a single state or entity. Conservation measures enacted with
respect to that portion of the fishery stock within any individual
state's exclusive area necessarily will be piecemeal vis-a-vis the
entire resource. The irrationality of attempting to manage an area
in which the fish may be found, rather than managing the fish
themselves, has already been recognized in various provisions of
current statutes and pending treaties concerning highly migratory
species. 47

An example of the global nature of fisheries problems is the possible economic impact of climatic change on world fisheries. Human
activity, in particular the effects of carbon dioxide accumulation
due to the combustion of carbon-based fuels, could cause higher air
temperatures, disturb the strength and direction of ocean currents,
and increase the average salinity and temperature of surface sea
water. 48 Fluctuations in these variables may affect, inter alia,
"spawning, migration, growth rates, food supplies, and predatorprey relationships." 49
There are numerous instances which demonstrate the sensitivity of marine fisheries to climatic change. The most dramatic is
probably the collapse of the Peruvian anchovy industry during 1972
44. LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 69.
45. Regional Approach, supra note 41, at 184.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 191.
48. Frye, Climatic Change and Fisheries Management, 23

NAT. RESOURCES

J. 77, 77, 85

(1983).
49. Id. at 88.
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(from a catch of twelve million metric tons to two million tons)
following the appearance of a warm current called "El Nino" which
dipped farther south than usual into Peruvian waters. 50 While the
degree to which El Nino affected the anchovies may have been
great, it was still speculative. El Nino merely added the "last straw"
to an "environmental threshold" that was already waiting to collapse due to previous overexploitation of the anchovies and poor
fisheries management by Peru. This situation also illustrates that
even when there is good fisheries management, a fisheries catch
level based on the principle of "maximum sustainable yield" may
not be enough. To allow for unexpected environmental changes such
as El Nino, an "environmental cushion" needs to be added to the
fish stocks maintained under the concept of maximum sustainable
yield.
Another dramatic example of the sensitivity of fisheries to
climatic change occurred during a warming trend between 1900 and
1940, when yields in the cod fishery of West Greenland increased
from zero to 70,000 tons. 51 The cod fishery collapsed due to an overall
cooling trend after 1940, which modified climatic patterns, including
currents, winds, and temperature.
Due to slow mixing which occurs between the surface and intermediate ocean waters, the full climatic effects resulting from any
given concentration of carbon dioxide might not be evident for
years. 52 Such a lengthy lag time makes climatic change essentially
irreversible, and this situation suggests that a remedial policy may
have to be formulated, implemented, and maintained for decades
without the benefit of supporting data or feedback. 53 Fisheries problems of such great magnitude can only be adequately managed by
international agreement.
B.

GOALS

A single international fishery objective is difficult to formulate
because fishing nations are economically, technologically,
biologically, socially, and politically diverse. For example, large
fishing companies dispatch modern fleets to distant-water fishing
grounds to compete with fishermen in many countries who use

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 89.
Id.
Id. at 95.
Id.
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fishing techniques similar to those used hundreds of years ago. 54
Despite the vast differences among nations, it has been generally
stated that:
The main purpose of international fisheries law is to facilitate
international fisheries practice with a minimum of international
friction. This does not mean that there be no disputes, but rather
that disputes be solved quickly and effectively. The major impediment to solution of international fishing disputes is the injection
of notions of sovereignty, national prestige, and ideology into what
is by nature an economic and pragmatic concern. Issues of military
security, naval manoeuvres, overflight, and a host of nonfishery
concerns complicate the solution of international fishery problems,
especially those that are a manifestation of coastal state/distant
water fishing state conflict. 55

The American Society of International Law (ASIL) has
delineated eight principles which should form the basis of an optimum global fisheries management policy. These principles state
that: (1) there should be an objective of establishing jurisdictional
bases for fisheries management entities; (2) the management entity should have the exclusive right to dispose of resources; (3) a global
fisheries monitoring agency should be established; (4) management
entities should be granted flexibility in management where systems
are not inconsistent with global standards; (5) the goal of the
management regime would be the maximization of opportunities
for that country; (6) there should be provisions for dispute settlement and avoidance; (7) actions inconsistent with any global fisheries
treaty should be curtailed; and (8) enforcement authority should be
given to the entity having jurisdiction.56 Many of these goals influenced the provisions in the LOS Convention, and the LOS Convention can be interpreted not only to support these goals, but also
to provide opportunities for giving effect to these principles - within
the general international framework delimited in the LOS
Convention.
U.S. ocean policy has several goals: security; management
(avoidance, reduction, and settlement) of conflict; promotion of ef54. THE LA w OF THE SEAS: NEEDS AND INTERESTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 95 (L. Alexander ed. 1972) (Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, June 26-29, 1972).
55. Ottenheimer, Patterns of Development in International Fishery Law, 1973 CANADIAN Y .B. INT'L L. 37, 38.
56. AM. Soc·y lNT'L L., Principles for a Global Fisheries Management Regime 1-20 (1974).
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ficiency and fair access in ocean use; protection of the environment;
and promotion of ocean research. In addition, there is an overall
goal of "maintaining a favorable legal order." 57 These goals overlap
and interface with the eight principles enumerated by the ASIL.
It has already been noted that equitable allocation of fishery
resources contributes to the goal of conflict management. Fairness
and equity in the allocation of resources may also include promoting
full utilization of resources to meet world needs, ensuring fair access to common resources, and stabilizing expectations with regard
to exclusive resources. Protection of the environment obviously includes conservation of living resources.
These goals are best achieved within the context of a legal
order where: (1) coastal states exercise control over coastal fish
stocks subject to effective conservation and environmental
safeguards and subject to the requirements of full utilization; (2)
the state of origin exercises the primary responsibility for management of its anadromous stocks subject to conditions ensuring effective conservation and full utilization; (3) highly migratory stocks
(e.g., tuna) are managed on a regional basis with assurances of fair
access; (4) cetaceans (e.g. whales and dolphins) are managed on a
global basis by an International Cetacean Commission (a successor
organization to the International Whaling Commission) to ensure
conservation both within and beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; and (5) sedentary species are managed by coastal states with
the jurisdictional limit being the 200-mile limit of the EEZ or the
edge of the continental margin whichever is farther seaward. 58
The LOS Convention provides for management of anadromous
species by the country of origin in article 66 which provides "States
in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate shall have the primary
interest in and responsibility for such stocks." 59 The FCMA claims
jurisdiction over those species of fish which "spawn" in the fresh
waters or in the estuarine waters of the United States and which
migrate thence to the ocean. The FCMA seems to assert the same
control over these species as is provided for in article 66, since in
all likelihood the term "spawn" is synonymous with the term
57. See Moore, A Foreign Policy For The Oceans, in THE OCEANS AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY 1, 2-4 (Center for Oceans Law & Policy, Apr. 1978).
58. Id. at 4. The edge of the continental margin should be delimited pursuant to a
Hedberg-type formula. See Hedberg, A Critique of Boundary Provisions in the Law of the
Sea Treaty, 12 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 337 (1983).
59. LOS Convention, supra note 18, art 66, para. 1.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss1/3

12

Kindt: The Law of the Sea: Anadromous and Catadromous Fish Stocks, Seden

The Law of the Sea

1984)

21

"originate." 60 Nonetheless, "[i]f 'originate' means that jurisdiction
over salmon is conferred upon the state from whose waters the fish
enter the ocean rather than upon the state in whose waters they
spawn, then the United States is exercising less authority in some
instances than the ... treaty provides." 61 It has been suggested
that because of the economic investment required of coastal states
to preserve anadromous species at harvestable levels, the catching
of these species on the high seas should be banned and that the
harvest be limited to territorial waters during the return of these
fish to their spawning grounds. 62 This approach, however, .is
politically unacceptable, at least without a form of economic "payoff'
for nonaccess. 63 Although coastal state regulation is the only effective means of protecting the inland spawning grounds of
anadromous species, an international treaty is needed to halt the
depletion of salmon that has resulted from the utilization of driftnetting techniques.
The LOS Convention does not go far enough in promoting these
goals. With regard to the management of highly migratory stocks,
it does not require coastal states which have these stocks within
their 200-mile zones to join regional organizations, and therefore,
coastal states may try to impose onerous restrictions on the taking
of highly migratory species. Indeed, the prevailing view is that
despite article 64 of the LOS Convention, these species are treated
no differently than other living resources within the coastal zone. 64
Article 64 of the LOS Convention, which governs highly migratory
species, should require membership in regional organizations for
these coastal states. 65
Possibly the most commercially important highly migratory
species is tuna, which is exempt from the fishery management
authority of the United States under the FCMA. 66 Under the majority view of the LOS Convention, the United States would be
authorized to manage tuna within its 200-mile zone, but the United
States may refuse to exercise this authority and continue to follow

60.
L. 24, 45
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See Burke, U.S. Fishery Management And The New Law Of The Sea, 76 AM. J. INT'L
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Burke].
Id.
LOS CASES, supra note 23, at 676.
Id.
Burke, supra note 60, at 41.
LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 64.
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1813 & 1802(14) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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a policy of regulating tuna fishing by international agreement. 67 The
purpose in not asserting jurisdiction over tuna within U.S. coastal
waters is to allow continued access of U.S. distant-water tuna
vessels to the coastal waters of other nations which might otherwise assert jurisdiction over tuna within their 200-mile zones. 68
Nonetheless, other countries have rejected U.S. claims that tuna
are not subject to coastal state regulation. Throughout the era of
UNCLOS III, the United States was one of a minority of countries
which did not claim jurisdiction over tuna. 69 As a result, the bluefin
tuna was heavily fished along the U.S. coast, and its numbers were
seriously depleted. 70 In the future, the need to protect this species
from over-fishing might preclude the United States from maintaining its policy of excluding tuna from its jurisdiction.71
This minority policy promulgated by the United States has provoked controversies with Canada, Mexico, and other nations relating
to access to tuna. 72 These controversies peaked in 1979, when
Canada, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Peru seized United States tuna
boats fishing within their 200-mile zones. 73 The United States
retaliated by placing embargoes on Costa Rican, Peruvian, and Canadian tuna and related tuna products. 74 Although much of the controversy surrounding U.S. fishing rights to tuna and other species
has been resolved,75 these conflicts demonstrated the need to replace
the discredited Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. 76
There is growing support for regulation of wide ranging
species, such as, tuna and whales, on an international basis since
these species have only minimal contact with the 200-mile zones
of coastal states. 77 Accordingly, article 64 of the LOS Convention
67. Burke, supra note 60, at 43.
68. Id.
69. Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Stocks: Hearing Before the National Ocean Policy Study of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1982).
70. Id. at 1.
71. Id.
72. See Note, The Tuna War: Fishery Jurisdiction In International Law, 1981 U. ILL.
L. REV. 755, 764-65, 767-68.
73. Note, Recent Develo]J1nents In The Law Of The Sea 1978-1979, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
691, 719 (1980) [hereinafter cited as LOS 1978-1979].
74. Id. at 720.
75. Id. See generally Rhee, The Application of Equitable Principles to Resolve the United
States-Canada Dispute Over East Coast Fishery Resources, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 667 (1980);
Donaldson & Pontecorvo, Economic Rationalization of Fisheries: The Problem of Conflicting
National Interests on Georges Bank, 8 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 149 (1980).
76. LOS 1978-1979, supra note 73, at 720.
77. LOS CASES, supra note 23, at 676.
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should have provided that nonmembers of the International Whaling
Commission (IWC) or its successor organization must adopt conservation measures in their economic zones which are "no less effective
than international standards." 78 It was unfortunate that this suggestion was not incorporated into article 64.
Sedentary species are generally defined as "organisms which,
at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed_or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with
the sea-bed or the subsoil." 79 Most disputes concerning sedentary
species involve various species of lobster and whether these are
included within this definition. 80 Article 77 of the LOS Convention
grants coastal states the right to exploit natural resources including
sedentary species contained within the continental shelf, 81 yet article 68 specifically exempts sedentary species from the EEZ restrictions imposed in part V. 82 Since the LOS Convention imposes no
obligations regarding yields or surplus, the FCMA recognizes
greater foreign rights to these living resources than is required
under the LOS Convention, and this results from subjecting sedentary species to the same FCMA management requirements as any
other species. 83
The ultimate goal of conservation is the maximization of food
production of the oceans. The LOS Convention calls for production
up to the "maximum sustainable yield." 84 The calculation of maximum sustainable yield, however, is a complicated exercise requiring a large amount of information about fish stocks, including
migratory patterns and breeding habits, 85 which may not be
available when such determinations become economically or
politically necessary.
Despite the possible void of information, the attractiveness of
the concept of MSY is: (1) its focus on maximization of fish production; (2) the definability and simplicity of the concept itself; and (3)
the availability of scientific tools that can at least reasonably approximate this value. 86 The primary objection to this highly quan78. See LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 64.
79. LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 77, para. 4.
80. LOS CASES, supra note 23, at 677.
81. LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 77.
82. Id. art. 68.
83. Burke, supra note 60, at 47.
84. See LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 61, para. 3.
85. Kronfol, supra note 15, at 465-66.
86. Burke, supra note 60, at 25.
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tifiable value is that the biological objectives of MSY do not adequately incorporate the socio-economic concerns of fishery
management. 87 Fishery economists have long noted that "management based on a biological objective such as MSY will inevitably
result in over-capacity in the fishery and the dissipation of the potential economic benefits which might be achieved if 'optimization' involved socio-economic objectives with biological constraints." 88 For
example, the use of MSY as a fishery management goal will result
in a failure to weigh the opportunity costs to society of utilizing
its limited resources to catch fish. 89 In any event, the objective concept of MSY is preferable to the most general concept of "optimum
yield" (OY), which allows nations more latitude in determining
harvestable levels. 90 Mechanisms for gathering information and standards for determining permissible catch must be developed.
The problems of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states must also be addressed. The traditional principle of mare
liberum guarantees all countries equal access to fisheries beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction. The guarantee, however, does
not promote maritime activities by the LL/GDS. The comprehensive law of the sea should allow these countries a more effective
share in the common heritage. 91
Finalization of the LOS Convention was an important step
toward resolving international fisheries problems, because the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case that in lieu of a LOS Treaty which was in force, proposals
arising out of UNCLOS III were to be considered as only the opinions of individual countries. 92 For even a binding agreement to effectively solve fisheries problems, procedures are required to avoid
and arbitrate disputes and to enforce substantive provisions.
C. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Fishery management and conservation are relatively new problems. Before 1900, fishery resources seemed unlimited, and fishing
nations generally exploited resources as their capabilities and need

87. Id.
88. Id. See generally Morey, Fishery Economics: An Introduction And Review, 20
RESOURCES J. 827, 830-41 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Morey].
89. Morey, supra note 88, at 840-41.
90. See Burke, supra note 60, at 28-29.
91. See Alverson, supra note 12, at 112.
92. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3.
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dictated. When the possibility of overfishing became apparent early
in this century, coastal states were without effective and comprehensive means to meet the problem. An initial concern was the competition for resources between contiguous nations and the impact
of the fishing fleets of distant nations. 93 One result was that a
number of unilateral claims were made to extend jurisdiction over
coastal waters.
Only thirty years ago, the three-mile territorial sea was standard, but since 1982 (at the latest), a twelve-mile limit has been
almost universally accepted. 94 One of the first important claims to
extended ocean resource jurisdiction was asserted in the Truman
Proclamations of 1945,95 whereby the United States claimed jurisdiction over fisheries and other resources in waters contiguous to the
coast of the United States. As a result of this action, the policy of
unilaterally claiming sovereignty over offshore resources became
a trend in international policy. 96 Unilateral extensions of coastal
state jurisdiction first became prevalent in South America. 97 In 1947,
Chile claimed a 200-mile resource zone in an attempt to protect its
whaling industry. 98 In the same year, Peru declared 200-mile jurisdiction in an attempt to protect its anchovies. 99 In 1952, several South
American States joined in the Santiago Declaration, the first
multilateral agreement proclaiming exclusive jurisdiction for particular purposes. 100 The concept of a 200-mile zone was rejected at
the Second U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II)

93. Comment, Fishery And Economic Zones As Customary International Law, 17 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 661, 664 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Fishery Zones].
94. See LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 3; Copes, supra note 10, at 234.
95. For a reprint of the Truman Proclamations, see Poli,cy of the United States With
Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Seabed of the Continental Shelf, Pres. Proc.
No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-48 Compilation), and Policy of the United States With Respect to
Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas, Pres. Proc. No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 68 (1943-48
Compilation). See also Fishery Zones, supra note 90, at 664; Jones, Freedom Of Fishing In
Decline: The Fishery Conservation And Management Act Of 1976 And The Implications For
Japan, 11 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 52, 67 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Fishing Decline].
96. Fishery Zones, supra note 93, at 664.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 664-65.
99. Id. at 665.
100. Agreements between Chile, Ecuador and Peru, signed at the First Conference on
the Exploitation and Conservation of the Maritime Resources of the South Pacific, Santiago,
18 August 1952, Declaration on the Maritime Zone, U.N. Doc. ST!LEG/SER.B/6, at 723-24
(1957) and U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/10/Rev.l, at 9-10 (1968). See Mirvahabi, Significant Fishery
Management Issues in the Law of the Sea Conference: Illusions and Realities, 15 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 493, 496-97 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Mirvahabi].
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in 1958. The countries at UNCLOS II also failed to reach agreement on the permissible extent of the territorial sea, although they
did define all maritime area beyond the territorial sea to be high
seas outside the control of any single nation. 101
Coastal states have justified unilateral extensions of maritime
jurisdiction by claiming the need for authoritative regulation to
achieve rational management and conservation and for protection
of vital national interests. 102 The ICJ gave support to these claims
in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case. 103 The Court recognized that a
coastal state dependent on its coastal fisheries has preferential
rights to coastal stocks paramount to the interests of other countries who wish to exploit the same resources. 104
Even so, assertions of full 200-mile "economic zones" were few
until the enactment of the FCMA. When the United States
unilaterally declared a 200-mile "fishery jurisdiction" via the FCMA,
the number of 200-mile claims mushroomed, and thereafter, it appeared that such limits would attain universal acceptance. All of
the major North American countries have now established such a
zone as have the European Common Market countries, Iceland, Norway, and the U.S.S.R. 105 By 1977, thirty-six countries had claimed
some form of 200-mile zone, 106 and more than a hundred delegates
to the first UNCLOS III session in Caracas supported this
development. 107 The debate continues, however, over the rights and
duties of the coastal state within this area. 108 The potential impact
on fisheries of claims to 200-mile zones is clear. If all coastal states
claimed 200-mile zones, the area enclosed would account for ninetyfour percent of the world's fish catch. 109
Approximately one-fifth of the world's fishery resources are
located within 200 miles of the U.S. coastline. 110 The FCMA grants
the United States exclusive control of virtually all of the living
marine resources within this zone, 111 an area encompassing almost
101. See Regional Approach, supra note 41, at 175.
102. See Copes, supra note 10, at 234.
103. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3.
104. Id. at 26.
105. Copes, supra note 10, at 234-35.
106. Regional Approach, supra note 41, at 174.
107. Mirvahabi, supra note 100, at 497.
108. Id. at 497-98.
109. Fishing Decline, supra note 95, at 73-74.
110. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ESTABLISHING A 200-MILE FISHERIES ZONE, 3
(1977) [hereinafter cited as 200-MILE ZONE).
111. Warner, supra note 8, at 97.
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2,250,000 square miles of ocean space. 112 The purpose of the FCMA
is to establish a fishery conservation zone, which is adjacent to the
coast of the United States in order to effectively manage and conserve fishery resources. 113 In passing the FCMA, Congress noted
that certain stocks of fish off the coasts of the United States had
"been overfished to the point where their survival is threatened
and other such stocks have been so substantially reduced in number
that they could become similarly threatened." 114 The FCMA purports to strike a balance between exploitation and conservation of
fisheries resources; however, the language of the Act weighs heavily
in favor of conservation. 115 The FCMA authorizes eight regional
fishery management councils which are responsible for developing
fishery management plans. 116 These management plans, among other
things, identify the optimum yield which can be harvested annually
in each fishery, and they determine the allowable level of foreign
fishing. 117 Under the FCMA, the OY is determined by first
establishing the MSY. 118
MSY is the biological determination of the number of "surplus"
fish that can be caught without overfishing the stock in question.
It is, in essence, the surplus production of the fishery; the safe upper limit of harvest which can be taken consistently year after year
without diminishing the stock so that the stock is truly inexhaustible and perpetually renewable. 119

The MSY is then modified by relevant ecological, economic, and
social factors to arrive at OY. 120 The Secretary of Commerce is
delegated the responsibility of reviewing and approving each of the
plans submitted by the councils, and the Secretary of State is
responsible for allocating any surplus fisheries harvest among the
various foreign nations. 121
112. 200-MILE ZONE, supra note 110, at 24.
113. Fishery Conservation and Management Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FCMA Hearings].
114. 200-MILE ZONE, supra note 110, at 4.
115. Warner, Finamore, & Bean, Practical Application Of The Conservation Aspects Of
The Fishery Conservation And Management Act, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 30, 49 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Finamore].
116. Id. at 33; see FCMA Hearings, supra note 113, at 171.
117. See FCMA Hearings, supra note 113, at 171.
118. Finamore, supra note 115, at 39-40.
119. Id. at 39.
120. Id. at 41.
121. FCMA Hearings, supra note 113, at 171; Finamore, supra note 115, at 34-35.
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In addition to conserving fisheries resources, one of the main
objectives of the FCMA is to give preference to U.S. fishermen
operating within the 200-mile zone of the United States. 122 This objective appears to have been accomplished, at least in part. In 1974,
foreign fishermen harvested 3.1 million metric tons of fish in U.S.
waters. In 1977, however, subsequent to the passage of the FCMA,
foreign fishermen harvested only 1.7 million metric tons. 123 The
number of foreign fishing vessels in this zone was reduced from
2,700 per year to approximately 933. 124 Additional enforcement
measures taken by the U.S. Coast Guard and/or the use of remotesensing devices might further reduce the harvest by foreign
fishermen. 125
The U.S. fishing industry has generally increased in importance
in international and domestic trade as a result of the FCMA. 126 The
value of fish caught from 3 to 200 miles off U.S. shores exceeds
$1 billion per annum. 127 The value of fish resources within the
200-mile zone will continue to grow with the utilization of new
technologies. For example, the United States is constructing processing barges which will be placed within the fishing grounds.
These barges will allow rapid processing of catches and will save
fishermen the expense of taking their catches to shore-based
facilities. Although the demand for fish in the United States far
exceeds the available domestic supply, the U.S. industry is beginning "to produce domestic equivalents for many of these imports." 128
The foreign demand for U.S. fish products has grown since passage
of the FCMA, and exports have more than doubled since 1976. 129
In short, some available statistics indicate that the FCMA has encouraged growth in the U.S. commercial fisheries. 13°From a foreign
policy perspective, however, the FCMA was a mistake because it
hamstrung the U.S. negotiators at UNCLOS III and encouraged the
rest of the international community to assert similar claims (a cost
122. FCMA Hearings, supra note 113, at 171; Warner, supra note 8, at 98.
123. FCMA Hearings, supra note 113, at 171-72.
124. Id. at 174 (statement of James Walsh, Deputy Administrator, National Oceanic

and Atmospheric Administration).
125. See 200-MILE ZONE, supra note 110, at 38-47.
126. Warner, supra note 8, at 98.
127. Id.; FISHERIES 1982, supra note 4, at 11.
128. Warner, supra note 8, at 98.
129. Id.; FISHERIES 1982, supra note 4, at 49.
130. Warner, supra note 8, at 98.
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which will eventually outweigh the short-term economic benefits
of the FCMA).
The passage of the FCMA had far reaching implications for
those nations dependent upon distant-water fishing, particularly
J apan. 131 Continued access to U.S. fishing grounds, especially the
productive area off the coast of Alaska, was and is vital to Japan
as a food source. 132 In 1975, Japanese fishing boats caught approximately 1.4 million metric tons of fish within the U.S. 200-mile zone. 133
The FCMA reduced the Japanese catch, and costs to each Japanese
fisherman increased as fees were imposed on foreign vessels working American fishing grounds. 134 Japan has warned that massive
unemployment and political upheaval could result from the extension of "offshore jurisdiction to reduce Japan's fishing quotas in
the North Pacific." 135
Despite the international impact of the FCMA, some studies
indicate that the overall performance of the U.S. fishing industry
subsequent to the passage of the FCMA has been disappointing. 136
The preferential access provided to U.S. fishermen under the FCMA
did not produce a "substantial economic growth or a net increase
in harvest over foreign fisherman." 137 In 1979, it was reported that
the United States had a balance of payment deficit in fishery products in excess of $2.1 billion, and foreign fishermen were still
harvesting between one-third and one-half of the fish taken in U.S.
waters. 138 Congress responded by enacting the American Fisheries
Promotion Act of 1980 (AFPA), 139 which amended the FCMA. The
AFP A was designed to attract increased investment to the U.S.
fishing industry and to increase the U.S. market share. The AFPA
affects all foreign nations fishing within the U.S. 200-mile fishery
131. Fishing Decline, supra note 95, at 56.
132. Id. at 53.
133. Id. at 56.
134. Id. at 56-57.
135. Id. at 96.
136. Note, Fishery Conservation: Is The Categorical Exclusion Of Foreign Fleets The Next
Step?, 12 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 154, 176 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Exclusion Of Fleets].
137. Id.
138. National Fishery Development Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979).
139. Pub. L. No. 96-561, tit. II, pt. C, 94 Stat. 3287 (1980) (codified at scattered sections
of 15, 16, 22, 43 & 46 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1981)). Section 238 changes the official title of the
FCMA to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MFCMA) (codified at
16 u.s.c. § 1801).
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conservation zone by: (1) increasing the permit fees imposed on
foreign fishermen; 140 (2) requiring, with limited exceptions, the
presence of a U.S. observer aboard each individual foreign fishing
vessel within the 200-mile zone; 141 (3) directing the Secretaries of
State and Commerce to review the extent to which foreign countries restrict market access to U.S. fi~h products; 142 (4) directing the
Secretaries to consider the extent to which foreign countries
cooperate with the enforcement of U.S. fishing regulations and the
operation of the domestic fishing industry; 143 and (5) establishing
a mechanism which under certain circumstances would completely
phase out foreign fishing within the 200-mile zone. 144
The primary criticism of the AFPA concerns the mandatory
phase-out provision. 145 Under a new method of calculation established
in the AFP A, it is possible that even though there is a surplus of
fish, foreign fishing can be phased out completely with regard to
a particular fishery. 146 By precluding foreign fishermen from catching the available surplus of U.S. fish, this provision appears to
violate the letter and spirit of article 62 of the LOS Convention. 147
Proponents of the AFP A claim that the phase-out provision is consistent with the LOS Convention which permits a coastal state to
protect and manage 148 the living resources within this 200-mile
zone. 149 It is claimed that while the objectives of the LOS Convention are to create an "optimum utilization of the living resources" 150
and to "produce the maximum sustainable yield," 151 these goals are
qualified by relevant economic factors. 152 "These qualifications
demonstrate that there is no absolute right of foreign states to the
surplus of fish in the 200-mile zones." 153 Thus, the LOS Convention
140. Id. § 232.
141. Id. § 236.
142. Id. § 231.
143. Id.
144. Id § 230; see Recent Development, Law Of The Sea: Protection Of Uni ted States
Fishing Interests-American Fisheries Promotion Act of 1980, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 485, 485
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Fishing Interests].
145. Fishing Interests, supra note 144, at 488.
146. Id. at 487-88.
147. Id. at 488-89; see Burke, supra note 60, at 54.
148. LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 61.
149. Fishing Interests, supra note 144, at 489.
150. LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 62, para. 1.
151. Id. art 61, para. 3.
152. Id.; Fishing Interests, supra note 144, at 489.
153. Fishing Interests, supra note 144, at 489.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss1/3

22

Kindt: The Law of the Sea: Anadromous and Catadromous Fish Stocks, Seden

The Law of the Sea

1984]

31

may permit the United States to temporarily preclude the
harvesting of surplus fish in light of its economic interests. 154
It is at least "arguable that the 'optimum yield' approach of
the FCMA, which made it less likely that foreign fishermen would
be precluded from harvesting the United States surplus, better
reflects prevailing views" 155 under the LOS Convention than does
the rigid formula of the AFP A. Nonetheless, Congress has considered legislation 156 that would go one step further and require a
total phase-out of foreign fishing. 157 In spite of the 1980 amendment
to the FCMA, the United States has experienced only a slight increase in its processed fish products since the passage of the
FCMA. 158 In 1982, the foreign fish catch (excluding tuna) within the
U.S. 200-mile zone was 1.4 million metric tons, while the combined
fish catch by U.S. and foreign vessels within the 200-mile zone was
only 2.5 million metric tons. 159 Despite these facts, the United States
should proceed to provide for increased refinement and enforcement of the FCMA. 160 The categorical exclusion of foreign fishing
fleets from the U.S. 200-mile zone, however, would violate international law and would result in adverse foreign reactions. 161 Although
the United States may unilaterally terminate its reciprocal bilateral
agreements, the United States could expect retaliation from other
countries through similar phase-out programs which would
adversely affect the U.S. fishing industry. 162
D.

TRENDS AND CONDITIONING FACTORS

Many scholars find the overwhelming acceptance of the
200-mile economic zone disturbing. While the concept is supposed
to preserve the preferential rights of the coastal states over coastal
fisheries and to encourage rational management, the problems of
such a system outweigh the benefits, and there are better ways
of achieving these goals. 163
Although an open access system is generally considered
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id. at 490.
See H.R. 7039, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. tit. III (1980).
Exclusion Of Fleets, supra note 136, at 154.
Id. at 178.
FISHERIES 1982, supra note 4, at iv.
Exclusion Of Fleets, supra note 136, at 203.
Id.
Id.
See Regional Approach, supra note 41, at 176.
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economically and biologically inefficient, management solely by national coastal zones has been deemed equally inadequate. 164 As few
species are contained within the coastal waters of a single country, the 200-mile zone concept is inadequate. 165 The interests of
neighboring countries sharing common fishery resources will conflict under a system of coastal state management, and in the case
of highly migratory species, conflicts will remain between the coastal
state and those nations fishing beyond the 200-mile zone. 166 Even
prior to the finalization of LOS Convention, national fisheries legislation demonstrated an awareness of the provisions in the earlier
negotiating texts and a desire to comply with them. 167 Consequently most legislation claims greater control over the 200-mile zone
while at least providing for the possibility of foreign fishing. 168 The
emphasis however, is on coastal state control over "access to
surplus," not the obligation of the coastal state to permit access. 169
The trend toward this new ocean regime has been spurred by
the quest of developing countries to obtain a degree of equalization with other countries by asserting sovereignty over natural
resources. 170 Although some countries, such as Japan, initially
resisted the 200-mile zone concept, they eventually recognized the
need to acquiesce to the inevitability of this trend, the need to protect their own resources, and the opportunity to enhance their own
bargaining position by establishing their own 200-mile zones. 171
The U.S. 200-mile zone is also increasing in importance because
of the political leverage it provides. In 1980, the United States
reacted to the U.S.S.R.'s invasion of Afghanistan by imposing
economic sanctions. The United States announced that it would
withhold sales of high technology equipment and grain and that the
Soviet Union's fishing privileges within U.S. waters would be
severely curtailed. Thus, the 200-mile zone concept provides an additional opportunity to use the world's food resources as a political
164. Prewo, supra note 1, at 265-66, 270.
165. Id. at 270-71.
166. Id. at 271.
167. Moore, National Legislation for the Management ofPisheries Under Extended Coastal
State Jurisdiction, 11 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 153, 176 (1980).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Kuribayashi, The New Ocean Regime and Japan, 11 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 95,
113-14 (1982).
171. Id. at 116; Fishing Decline, supra note 95, at 101-03; see Anand, The Politics of a
New Legal Order for Fisheries, 11 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 265, 282 (1982).
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weapon, although such action would appear to violate the LOS Convention if no reallocation of the surplus is made.

E. POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There are two policy alternatives in the area of fisheries
management and conservation, excluding the possibility of surrendering all jurisdiction to the unilateral desires of coastal states.
The first is the implementation of the common heritage principl_e
on a global scale. The common heritage principle was an integral
part of the UNCLOS III negotiations involving the deep sea-bed,
but it can also be applied to living resources.
Under this alternative, a global agency responsible for fisheries
management and conservation would be established. The focus of
such an agency would be on the efficient and equitable control of
resources, and not on the spatial acquisition of territory .112 This
global organization would provide technical service to each country
and assist in the collection and collation of the voluminous biological
and scientific data needed to meet management and conservation
goals. 173 The agency would gather the necessary knowledge about
unexploited stocks which it could disseminate to developing countries. More importantly, the delegation of enforcement power to
a central agency would promote uniformity and effectiveness of
regulation. 174 A successor organization to the IWC (specifically an
International Cetacean Commission with expanded jurisdiction,
perhaps including fisheries) would be a good initial organization for
implementing the ASIL goals.
The common heritage philosophy would have to be accepted
by all coastal states before such a regime could function. Otherwise, there would be no motivation for countries to surrender their
present sovereignty to an international organization. 175 Preferential treatment of coastal states and of those nations which are heavily dependent on foreign fisheries could be implemented through
such a system. 176 This alternative seeks a compromise between purely national control and control based on an equitable share of the
living resources of the ocean.
The second alternative is actually a variation of the common
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See Alverson, supra note 12, at 118.
Id.
I d. at 119.
Regional A pproach, supra note 41, at 189.
See i d. at 189-90.
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heritage philosophy. It involves regional implementation of the common heritage principle through shared economic zones. 177 A regional
approach offers the advantages of controlled resource utilization,
while maintaining traditional high seas freedoms. Negotiation for
access to distant fishery stocks is also simplified under such a plan.
Negotiations are necessary only between the representatives of the
few regional zones involved, rather than between representatives
of the several individual countries. 178 In addition, member states
of a given regional zone would not need to negotiate to fish within
the EEZ's of any of its regional neighbors, since the regional "umbrella" pact would cover them all. 179
Intraregional political cooperation between developing countries in offshore fishery management might also extend to other
arenas giving them a solidarity and power which they lack
individually. 180 Regional cooperation might also lead to large scale
economic integration analogous to that of the European Common
Market. 181 Economic cooperation would allow developing nations to
exploit more fully both the marine and land-based natural resources
in their region. 182
The regional approach is probably more viable. The trend
toward unilateral claims of complete sovereignty over coastal waters
is blunted by regional arrangements. A coastal state would hesitate
to risk losing the economic support of its regional neighbors to
achieve total control over an area in which it already enjoyed
beneficial control. In addition, the interests of both landlocked and
coastal states could be met more effectively .183
The regional approach requires coordination of legal claims between those nations participating in the regional agreement. It is
consistent with, although not required by, the LOS Convention and
has certain advantages. Individual nations may decide that there
is greater security in protecting their shared regional interests,
reducing the possibility of excessive territorial seas. 184 A regional
approach would also be easy to incorporate into the framework of
177. Id. at 190.
178. Id. at 192.
179. Id. at 190-92; see Alexander, Regional Arrangements In The Oceans, 71 AM. J. INT'L
L. 84, 101 (1977).
180. Regional Approach, supra note 41, at 192-93.
181. Id. at 193.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 193-94.
184. Id. at 195.
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the LOS Convention. The major shortfall of the proposal is that
it does not effectively utilize the concept of the common heritage. 185
Equitable distribution of resources, stability of the regional zones,
and effective conservation measures would probably not be fully
accomplished. 186
This proposal for a regional authority would require the countries of a region to surrender at least part of their jurisdictional
authority over their respective fishery zones to a regional body comparable to the world agency discussed earlier. Under such a regime,
"a single off-shore area would be created and managed by the
regional authority." 187
One large zone would be more likely to include a greater portion of a fishery stock, thereby making any conservation measures
more effective. The participation of landlocked states in the combined zones would benefit the region through multinational interaction and regional solidarity. 188 Special interests of countries in the
region could easily be taken into account. Fishing quotas and specific
allowances could be granted to landlocked states in exc·h ange for
economic considerations. 189
Both global and regional schemes have their strengths and
weaknesses, but after balancing the equities, the better and more
practical course of action involves implementation of the regional
approach. Whether regional zones are established through ad hoc
regional cooperation or through a regional authority is not critical.
The impact of such a system could be lessened by first instituting
regional cooperation and then, if the situation warrants, moving
toward a regional authority. The problems involving the management and conservation of fishery stocks are crucial and must be
solved if the ocean is to continue providing for mankind.
After the initial U.S. blunder of enacting the FCMA and
thereby unilaterally extending U.S. fisheries jurisdiction to 200
miles, the United States tried to mitigate the international impact
of the FCMA by utilizing bilateral and regional fishery arrangements, particularly bilateral "Agreements Concerning
Fisheries off the Costs of the United States" which are popularly
termed "Governing International Fishery Agreements" (GIFA's).
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

196.
195-96.
197-98.
198.
198-200.
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While the FCMA, as modified by AFP A, constitutes the major
U.S. legislation governing fisheries, other related U.S. legislation
includes:
a. the State Commercial Fisheries Research and Development
Act of 1964,190
b. the Anadromous Fish Conservation Act of 1965 (AFCA), 191
c. the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 192
d. the Salmon and Steelhead Conservation and Enhancement
Act of 1980, 193
e. the Atlantic Salmon Convention Act of 1982,194
f. the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA), 195
g. the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), 196
h. the Estuarine Areas Act of 1968, 197
1.
the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958 (FWCA), 198
and
j. the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act of 1980 (PNEPPCA). 199
The CZMA provides grants to states to develop and administer
programs for managing resources and uses within their coastal
areas. This program was supplemented and revised under the
FCMA, which established the eight Regional Fishery Management
Councils. 200
Since the FWCA failed to adequately protect the fish and
wildlife of the Columbia River Basin of the Pacific Northwest, Congress enacted the PNEPPCA in 1980.201 The Columbia Basin supplies about eighty percent of the area's electric energy needs while
supporting the world's largest runs of steelhead trout and chinook
190. 16 U.S.C. § 779 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
191. Id. § 757a (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
192. Id. §§ 1531-1543 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
193. Pub. L. No. 96-561, tit. I, 94 Stat. 3275 (1980) (codified at scattered sections of 16
U.S.C. (Supp. V 1981)).
194. 16 u.s.c. § 3601 (1982).
195. Id. §§ 1451-64 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981).
196. Id. §§ 1361-1407 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
197. Id. §§ 1221-26 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
198. Id. §§ 661-668ee (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
199. Id §§ 839-839h (Supp. V 1981).
200. See Smith, Management Of Living Resources, in MANAGING NATIONAL OCEAN
RESOURCES 57, 58 (Center for Oceans Law & Policy, Jan. 1979).
201. Blumm, Fulfilling The Parity Promise: A Perspective On Scientific Proof, Economic
Cost, And Indian Treaty Rights In The Approval Of The Columbia Basin Fish And Wildlife
Program, 13 ENVTL. L. 103, 156-57 (1982).
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salmon. 202 The two "in-stream" uses of the Columbia Basin,
hydroelectric power generation and anadromous fish protection,
have come into conflict 203 causing a decline in anadromous fish runs.
This Act "offers the promise of belatedly elevating fish and wildlife
considerations to equal status with the other purposes for which
Columbia Basin water projects are operated." 204 Thus the PNEPPCA
should serve to protect the coastal fisheries and to resurrect the
Indian treaty right to have the fishing resources maintained free
of manmade despoliation. 205
In the two years subsequent to enactment of the FCMA, U.S.
harvests of fish stocks in the 200-mile zone were approximately
700,000 metric tons per annum while the foreign catch in the same
waters totalled 1.8 million metric tons; however, 1.9 million metric
tons of the total catch of 2.5 million metric tons was taken within
the U.S. three-mile limit. 206 Therefore, these figures refute to some
extent the exaggerated claims of numerous fish stocks between the
three-mile and 200-mile limits. Such claims constituted a primary
argument for enacting the FCMA. In any event, the U.S. annual
catch contributes approximately $7 billion to the gross national product of the United States. 207
In an attempt to fully utilize resources within the 200-mile zone,
Congress proposed a bill which would have promoted the development of an American fishing industry in certain underutilized
species (AMFISH). 208 It purported to further the objectives of the
FCMA and defined an underutilized species as one for which a total
allowable level of foreign fishing has been determined in accordance
202. Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon: The Struggl,e Of The Pacific Northwest's Anadromous
Fish Resources For A Peaceful Coexistence With The Federal Columbia River Power System,
11 ENVTL. L. 211, 212-13 (1981).
203. Id. at 213.
204. Blumm & Johnson, Promising A Process For Parity: The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning And Conservation Act And Anadromous Fish Protection, 11 ENVTL. L.
497, 499 (1981).
205. Id. at 533; see Note, United States v. Washington: Implied Treaty Rights To Continue Fishing, 18 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 659, 672 (1982). See generally Landau, Empty Victories:
Indian Treaty Fishing Rights In The Pacific Northwest, 10 ENTVL. L. 413 (1980); Washington

State 's Salmon And Steelhead Resources: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
206. Cong. Research Serv., Fisheries Development 2 (Issue Brief No. IB 79112, July
15, 1980).
207. Id. at 1.
208. Underutilized Species Development Act of 1979, H.R. REP. No. 4360, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979).
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with the FCMA, section 201(d). 209 This bill met resistance because
it was designed to permit foreign-built and foreign-flag fishing
vessels to participate in the U.S. harvest, and this was viewed as
counterproductive to the FCMA policy of phasing out foreign
fishing. 210
Another plan suggested to help increase the yields of the U.S.
fishing industry would require processors to draw vessels away
from overcapitalized segments of the industry in order to dev~lop
underutilized markets. 211 In 1979, for example, the entire quota of
king crab was harvested in just twenty-eight days. 212 The
underutilized U.S. vessels could be used to develop the Alaskan
ground fish harvest, which during the early 1980's was taken almost
entirely by foreign nations. 213
Tax deferrals have also been proposed as a means of encouraging growth within the U.S. fishing industry. 214 Since harvesting
capacity has exceeded the capabilities of processing facilities, it has
been suggested that those tax deferral provisions which encourage
the acquisition of additional vessels should be extended to provide
similar incentives for the new construction of shoreside processing facilities. 215
Private salmon ranching in the ocean has become another profitable development in the Pacific coast fishing industry. 216 Salmon
are raised in hatcheries from the egg to the smolt stage. 211 Then
they are released from coastal facilities, and a small percentage of
these salmon will return to spawn eighteen to fifty months later. 218
After ascending the fish ladders into the facilities from which they
were released, they are harvested and processed for market. 219
209. Amfish: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and
Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
1, 3 (1979).
210. Id. at 1-2.
211. Stokes & Offord, Alaska Groundfish: A Financial Feasibility Analysis, 9 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L.J. 61, 75 (1981).
212. Id. at 75-76.
213. Id. at 62.
214. Capital Construction Fund for Fishery Processing Facilities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Merchant Marine of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1983).
215. Id.
216. Berg, Private Ocean Ranching Of Pacific Salmon And Fishery Management: A Problem Of Federalism, 12 ENVTL. L. 81, 81 (1981).
217. Id. at 83.
218. Id. at 83-84.
219. Id. at 84.
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Although the ecological implications of ocean ranching are not fully
understood, it is fast becoming a significant fishery industry. 220

III. SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF THE SEA PROVISIONS
The LOS Convention and the FCMA illustrate the problems
of managing fish stocks through unilateral, coastal state competence.
The meanings of the words "maximum sustainable yield," "optimum
yield," and "full utilization" determine the degree to which the
resources will be harvested and to whom they will be allocated.
As a point of information, the language "optimum utilization" in
the LOS Convention has replaced "optimum yield" in earlier drafts,
but the concepts have remained similar. As indicated earlier, under
the LOS Convention a coastal state has the right to determine the
allowable catch of fish stocks within its economic zone as part of
maintaining the maximum sustainable yield of those stocks and
determining their optimum utilization. 221 Article 61, paragraph 3,
of the LOS Convention provides that a coastal state shall implement conservation and management measures "designed to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can
produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant
environmental and economic factors ...." 222 A secondary requirement under article 62, paragraph 1, appears to obligate a coastal
state to "promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living
resources in the exclusive economic zone without prejudice to article 61." 223 Under these provisions, MSY appears to be a scientific
determination made by the coastal state within certain parameters,
while OY appears to be more of an obligation to allow other countries to harvest those stocks (up to the MSY) which the coastal state
does not harvest. 224 In this context, either the words "optimum
utilization" should be stricken from article 64 governing highly
migratory species, or more appropriately, "cetaceans" should be
deleted from annex I and thus from the jurisdiction of article 64. 225
By contrast, the MSY and OY are mentioned neither in article 66 governing anadromous species 226 (which spawn in fresh water
and spend most of their lives in salt water) nor in article 67 govern220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 130.
Kronfol, supra note 15, at 464; see Burke, supra note 60, at 29.
LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 61, para. 3.
Id. art. 62, para. 1.
See id. arts. 61-62.
Id. art. 64 & Annex I.
LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 66.
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ing catadromous species (which spawn in salt water and spend most
of their lives in fresh water). 227 For anadromous stocks, the jurisdiction of the coastal state in whose waters they spawn follows them
wherever they swim. 228 Catadromous species are under the jurisdiction of the coastal state in whose waters they spend most of their
life cycle. 229 Sedentary species are not governed by this part of the
LOS Convention. 230
A main problem in this area involves the way in which the concepts of MSY and OY interface with the "full utilization" requirements under the FCMA. 231 In this context, Professor William
Burke has highlighted the need for more precise definitions and
scientific information. 232 In interpreting the FCMA, there is little
reason to concede that:
MSY may only supplant OY if biological and other data are inadequate. Modification of MSY to OY, which can be more or less than
MSY, is to be based on other relevant factors, remembering that
optimum with respect to a fishery's yield means providing the
greatest overall benefit to the Nation, especially in terms of food
production.
A council [i.e., one of eight councils established under the
FCMA] may have perfectly adequate biological, economic, social,
and ecological data, the political relevance of which impels its
members to set an OY equal to MSY. Without some or all of these
data, it is politic to adhere to MSY, which is generally understood,
than to depart from this figure for a more speculative, less comprehensible OY. There may be no useful social and economic data
with which to modify MSY.
In real terms, OY must be defined by councils' actions. It may
be defined as something other than a number in metric tons. 233

As the Fishery Management Plans (FMP's) being prepared by
the FCMA regional councils are "primarily done by biologists, maximum sustainable yield, a biological concept, and not optimum yield
as defined in the FCMA is the controlling factor in regulations pro227. Id. art. 67.
228. Id. art. 66, para. 1.
229. Id.
230. Id. art. 68.
231. FCMA Hearings, supra note 113, at 844-45 (statement of Langdon Warner, Science
Associate, Environmental Defense Fund); see Burke, supra note 60, at 24-35.
232. See Burke, supra note 60, at 24-35.
233. FCMA Hearings, supra note 113, at 828, 830 (statement of Tom Reynolds, Executive
Director, National Fish Meal and Oil Association).
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mulgated by the Councils." 234 In addition, there is "the lack of socioeconomic data available for inclusion into the FMP's resulting essentially in MSY being renamed OY." 235 Accordingly, definitions must
be clarified, and the standards for preparing FMP' s must be made
uniform. 236 The Environmental Defense Fund has suggested that
the definition of MSY under the FCMA be modified in part to mean
"the largest [average] annual catch or yield in terms of weight of
fish caught by both commercial and recreational fishermen that can
be taken [continuously] from a stock without forcing it below a
specified minimum population level and structure [under existing
environmental conditions )." 237
Instead of debating definitions, a better approach to a solution
might be to implement:
a. a regionally coordinated, nationwide system for collecting
marine recreational fishing statistics;
b. ecological research, including stock assessment and comprehensive predator-prey studies; and
c. the identification of social and economic data needs and
priorities and development of cost effective methodoligies for collecting these data. 238

This appears to be the best solution. In any event, this situation
involving the FMP's and the FCMA needs to be resolved before
adequate protection of U.S. fish stocks can be accomplished. Additionally, any final determinations should conform to the MSY and
OY concepts formulated in articles 61 and 62 of the LOS
Convention. 239
234. Id. at 902, 903 (statement of W.F. "Zeke" Grader, President, Western Region of
the National Federation of Fishermen).
235. Id. at 903.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 848, 865-66 (petition of the Environmental Defense Fund for the Amendment
of the Guidelines for Development of Fishery Management Plans) (inserts and emphasis
original).
238. Id. at 992-94 (communication submitted by Ronald F. Labisky).
239. See LOS Convention, supra note 18, arts. 61-62.
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APPENDIX I
1979 and 1980 Nominal Catches: By Species Groups
(in metric tons)
FRESHWATER FISHES: Nominal catches by species, major fishing areas and countries
1979
1980
Carps, barbels and other cyprinids
597,404
616,167
Tilapias and other cichlids
363,942
367,421
Miscellaneous freshwater fishes
5,023,054
5,213,278
DIADROMOUS FISHES: Nominal catches by species, major fishing areas and countries
Sturgeons, paddlefishes, etc.
28,781
29,117
River eels
85,197
91,636
Salmons, trouts, smelts, etc.
750,718
770,276
Shads, milkfishes, etc.
770,399
817,990
Miscellaneous diadromous fishes
154,704
125,295
MARINE FISHES: Nominal catches by species, major fishing areas and countries
Flounders, halibuts, soles, etc.
1,145,559
1,084,367
10,608,533
10,719,675
Cods, hakes, haddocks, etc.
Redfishes, basses. congers, etc.
5,357,953
5,247,227
Jacks, mullets, sauries, etc.
7,950,863
7,338,318
Herrings, sardines, anchovies, etc.
15,719,039
16,225,200
Tunas, bonitos, billfishes, etc.
2,384,854
2,489, 795
Mackerels, snoeks, cutlassfishes, etc.
4,414,932
4,226,312
582,957
Sharks, rays, chimaeras, etc.
579, 723
Miscellaneous marine fishes
7,064,305
7,581,510
CRUSTACEANS: Nominal catches by species, major fishing areas and countries.
82,787
Freshwater crustaceans
91,433
848,256
Sea-spiders, crabs, etc.
836,64 7
108,134
Lobsters, spiny-rock lobsters etc.
111,483
56,227
Squat-lobsters, nephrops, etc.
76,674
1,680,954
Shrimps, prawns, etc.
1,560,507
424,821
Krill, prawns, etc.
386,882
66,115
Miscellaneous marine crustaceans
71,152
MOLLUSCS: Nominal catches by species, major fishing areas and countries
Freshwater molluscs
255,180
266,588
Abalones, winkles, conchs, etc.
72,460
86,595
Oysters
873,060
972,885
Mussels
582,298
613,965
Scallops, pectens, etc.
398,522
364,173
Clams, cockles, arkshells, etc.
1,053,494
1,176,771
Squids, cuttlefishes, octopuses, etc.
1,558,814
1,572,098
Miscellaneous marine molluscs
143,511
165,231
WHALES, SEALS AND OTHER AQUATIC MAMMALS: Catches by species, major fishing areas
and countries
743*
742*
Blue-whales, fin-whales, etc.
13,045*
Sperm-whales, pilot-whales, etc.
3,769*
2,807*
Porpoises, dolphins, etc.
449,035
Eared seals, hair seals, walruses, etc.
1,000
1,061
Miscellaneous aquatic mammals
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MISCELLANEOUS AQUATIC ANIMALS: Nominal catches by species, major fishing areas and
countries
Frogs and other amphibians
1,088
695
Turtles and other reptiles
7,377
6,248
Sea-squirts and other tunicates
4,275
5,527
134
232
Horseshoe crabs and other arachnoids
Sea-urchins and other echinoderms
65,715
55,653
Miscellaneous aquatic invertebrates
72,820
73,836
MISCELLANEOUS AQUATIC ANIMAL PRODUCTS: Production by species, major fishing areas
and countries
Pearls, mother-of-pearl, shells, etc.
5,695
5,832
Corals
126
205
Sponges
104
130
Aquatic bird guano, eggs, etc.
36,189
30,288
AQUATIC PLANTS: Production by species, major fishing areas and countries
Brown seaweeds
23,537,265
2,403,389
Red seaweeds
771, 771
825,178
Green seaweeds and other algae
3,403
9,449
Miscellaneous aquatic plants
89,888
78,777

*Estimates in actual numbers-not in metric tons.
Source: 50 U.N. FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, YEARBOOK OF FISHERY STATISTICS 43-45, 208-12,
223-26 (1981).
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APPENDIX II

Regional Fisheries Organizations

FAO-SPONSORED
CARP AS
CECAF
GFCM
IOFC
IPFC
WECAFC

Regional Fisheries Advisory Commission for the Southwest Atlantic
Fishery Commission for the Eastern Central Atlantic
General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean
Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission
lndo-Pacific Fisheries Council
Western Central Atlantic Fishery Commission

INDEPENDENT
BS SSC
IATTC
IBSFC
ICCAT
ICNAF
ICSEAF
IN PFC
IPHC
IPSFC
IWC
JKFC
JSFC
MC
MCBSF
NEAFC
NPFSC
PCSP
SCNEA
SCSK

Baltic Sea Salmon Standing Committee
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna
International Commission for the North-West Atlantic Fisheries
International Commission for the South-East Atlantic Fisheries
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission
International Pacific Halibut Commission
International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission
International Whaling Commission
Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Fisheries Commission
Japanese-Soviet Fisheries Commission for the North-West Pacific
Mixed Commission of 1962 (Baltic Sea)
Mixed Commission for Black Sea Fisheries
North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission
Permanent Commission of the Conference on the Use and Conservation of the
Marine Resources of the South Pacific
Sealing Commission for the North-East Atlantic
Shellfish Commission for the Skagerak-Kattegat

RELATED PROGRAMS AND ORGANIZATIONS
Committee for the Co-ordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in
Asian Offshore Areas
Co-operative Investigations of the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions (now
CIC AR
IOCARIBE)
CIESM
International Commission for the Scientific Exploration of the Mediterranean
Sea
Co-operative Investigations in the Mediterranean
CIM
IDOE
International Decade of Ocean Exploration
IGY
International Geophysical Year
IOC
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
IOCARIBE IOC Association for the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions
IOC Working Committee for Training, Education, and Mutual Assistance
TEMA
CCOP

Source: See Alexander, Regional Arrangements In The Oceans, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 84, 101 (1977).
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APPENDIX III
Countries who are Signatories to Bilateral Agreements under the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976: Agreements
Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the United States (GIF A's)*
1. GIFA, U.S.-Bulgaria, Dec. 17, 1976, [1976-77] 4 U.S.T. 3955, T.l.A.S. No. 9045.
2. GIFA, U.S. Denmark, Sept. 5, 1979, [1979] 6 U.S.T. 4859, T.l.A.S. No. 9649 (effective Jan.
18, 1980).
3. GIFA, U.S.-European Economic Community, Feb.15, 1977, [1976-77] 4 U.S.T. 3787, T.l.A.S.
No. 8598 (effective June 9, 1977).
4. GIFA, U.S.-German Democratic Republic, Oct. 5, 1976, [1976-77] 2 U.S.T. 1793, T.l.A.S.
No. 8527 (effective Mar. 4, 1977).
5. GIFA, U.S.-Japan, Sept. 10, 1982, T.l.A.S. No. 10480 (effective Jan. 1, 1983).
6. GIFA, U.S.-Korea, Jan. 4, 1977, [1976-77] 2 U.S.T. 1753, T.l.A.S. No. 8526 (effective Mar.
3, 1977).
7. GIFA, U.S.-Norway, Jan. 26, 1981, T.l.A.S. No. 10077 (effective May 15, 1981).
8. GIFA, U.S.-Poland, Aug. 2, 1976, [1976-77] 2 U.S.T. 1681, T.l.A.S. No. 8524 (effective Feb.
28, 1977).
9. GIFA, U.S.-Portugal, Oct. 16, 1980, T.l.A.S. No. 9929 (effective Mar. 4, 1981).
10. GIFA, U.S.-Spain, July 29, 1982, (effective Jan. 17, 1983).
11. GIFA, U.S.-USSR, Nov. 26, 1976 [1976-77] 2 U.S.T.1847, T.l.A.S. No. 8528 (effective Feb.
28, 1977).

*GIF A is the general abbreviation for a bilateral treaty negotiated under the FCMA and
properly entitled an "Agreement Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the United States."
The GIFA's initials derived from the popular general term for such an agreement; namely,
a "Governing International Fishery Agreement." As of the date this chart was prepared,
several U.S.T. cites were not yet available.
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APPENDIX IV
A.

B.

Selected Major Agreements Related to Fisheries
Multilateral Treaties to which the United States has Acceded as of 1983*
1. Fisheries
Convention on Fishings and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,
done Apr. 29, 1958, [1966] 1U.S.T.138, T.l.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (effective Mar. 20, 1966).
Amended Agreement for the Establishment of the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council,
approved Nov. 23, 1961, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2511, T.I.A.S. No. 5218, 418 U.N.T.S. 348
(effective Nov. 23, 1961).
Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission,
signed May 31, 1949, [1950] 1 U.S.T. 230, T.I.A.S. No. 2044, 80 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective Mar. 3, 1950).
International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean,
signed May 9, 1952, [1953] 1 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786, 205 U.N.T.S. 65 (effective June 12, 1953).
U.N. Special Fund Project on Caribbean Fishery Development, signed Apr. 6, 1966,
[1968] 4 U.S.T. 4938, T.I.A.S. No. 6501 (effective Apr. 6, 1966).
Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, done May 14, 1966, [1969] 3 U.S.T.
2887, T.I.A.S. No. 6767, 673 U.N.T.S. 63 (effective Mar. 21, 1969).
2. South Pacific Commission
Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission, signed Feb. 6, 1947, [1951] 2
U.S.T. 1787, T.l.A.S. No. 2317, 97 U.N.T.S. 227 (effective July 29, 1948).
3. Whaling
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, concluded Sept. 24, 1931, 49 Stat. 3079,
T.S. No. 880, 3 Bevans 26, 155 U.N.T.S. 349 (effective Jan 16, 1935).
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling with Schedule of Whaling Regulations,
signed Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.l.A.S. No. 1849, 4 Bevans 248, 161 U.N.T.S.
72 (effective Nov. 10, 1948).
Protocol to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling Signed Unde1
Date of Dec. 2, 1946, done Nov. 19, 1956, [1959] 1 U.S.T. 952, T.l.A.S. No. 4228,
338 U.N.T.S. 336 (effective May 4, 1959).
Multilateral Treaties Not Involving the United States
1952 Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, 205 U.N.T.S.
65.
London Fisheries Convention, Mar. 9, 1964, 581U.N.T.S.57, reprinted in U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG.SER.B/15, at 862 (1970).
Draft Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfront Habitat, done Feb. 3, 1971, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 969 (1972).

*Those cites without U.N.T.S. references are caused by the slowness of the U.N. system
in printing the U.N.T.S.
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